

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITY:
WHEN AND WHERE SHOULD LEADER
DEVELOPMENT BEGIN?**

by

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ABSTRACT

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Education, leader development, training, and motivation are critical to the success of the United States Army. Responding appropriately to disaster relief operations or other type of civil support operations requires Soldiers to have the right mindset when conducting these missions. The right mindset means Soldiers realizing they are not in charge but in support of providing Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA). Many Soldiers have not always understood this proper relationship, and the Army must educate its leaders on the roles and responsibilities of conducting civil support operations. Prior to disaster relief or civil support operations, the military needs to educate and to develop its leaders on MACA. Doing so not only increases the leaders' self awareness about military support but builds flexibility within an organization. The importance of conducting MACA operations requires the military to identify and to develop appropriate education measures and to teach those measures as part of an individual's career progression. This Strategy Research Project (SRP) will examine how much MACA education is needed and at what point in a leader's career. It concludes with recommendations to enhance MACA education as part of leader development and proposes methods to improve leader self-development.

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITY: WHEN AND WHERE SHOULD LEADER DEVELOPMENT BEGIN?

DoD has traditionally played a role in domestic security matters only when absolutely necessary. DoD would provide support to federal, state and local responders when civilian capacities become overwhelmed. For instance, DoD could provide transportation or medical support in the event of a natural or man-made disaster. Also DoD could be called upon to provide security at national security special events.

- Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense,
Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, May 2002.

THESIS AND METHODOLOGY

Education, leader development, training, and motivation are critical to the success of the United States Army. Responding appropriately to disaster relief operations or other type of civil support operations requires Soldiers to have the right mindset when conducting these missions. The right mindset means Soldiers realizing they are not in charge but in support of providing Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA). Many Soldiers have not always understood this proper relationship, and the Army must educate its leaders on the roles and responsibilities of conducting civil support operations. Prior to disaster relief or civil support operations, the military needs to educate and to develop its leaders on MACA. Doing so not only increases the leaders' self awareness about military support but builds flexibility within an organization. The importance of conducting MACA operations requires the military to identify and to develop appropriate education measures and to teach those measures as part of an individual's career progression. This Strategy Research Project (SRP) will examine how much MACA education is needed and at what point in a leader's career. It concludes with recommendations to enhance MACA education as part of leader development and proposes methods to improve leader self-development.

BACKGROUND

The need for the military to assist civil authorities stems from our core national values.¹ Throughout history, the military has played a critical role in setting up organizations that provide assistance to civil authorities as a result of domestic and manmade emergencies or in response to civil disturbances. The National Strategy for Homeland Security states that the "Department of Defense (DoD) contributes to homeland security through its military missions overseas, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities."² The National Security Strategy (NSS) and

the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provided the foundation for the military to accomplish these strategic goals. The National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the strategic documents such as the NSS and QDR and articulates three supporting objectives for the military: to protect the United States against external attacks and aggression; to prevent conflict and surprise attack; and to prevail against adversaries.³

The DoD continues to play a critical role in providing military assistance to civil authorities in response to domestic disasters, civil disturbances, and homeland defense. The NMS states that when directed, “the Armed Forces will provide support to civil authorities, including capabilities to manage the consequences of an attack.”⁴ The premise states that when local, state, and federal authorities have exhausted all available resources, they can request DoD assistance following a major disaster, civil emergency, crisis management circumstance, and consequence management event. Consequently, the United States military has a long history of providing support and assistance to civil authorities during domestic emergencies such as fires, hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes when civilian responders are overwhelmed.⁵

When the military responds to a disaster, they remain in support of a Lead Federal Agency (LFA) with the exception of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE) who is the primary agency for Emergency Support Function (ESF) 3 when the National Response Plan (NRP) is initiated. An exception to the above statement involves defense of our homeland. DoD is the LFA for homeland defense missions and responsible for protecting our Nation from land, maritime, and aerospace threats. One example where DoD became the LFA was on 9/11. In retaliation to the terrorist attacks on our Nation, the military had fighter jets conducting combat air patrol (CAP) missions to defend the United States airspace against further terrorist attacks.

WHY IS LEADER DEVELOPMENT NEEDED?

As stated earlier, the military has played a vital role in providing assistance for past domestic disasters. Even with the military’s long history of supporting civil authorities after the President has declared a major disaster or emergency, most senior leaders are not well prepared by the military education system as they enter into their field on the systems and laws that apply to domestic support operations.⁶ Responding appropriately to disaster relief operations or other types of civil support operations requires Soldiers to have the right mindset when executing MACA type missions. Most Soldiers have not always understood this proper relationship, and the Army must educate its leaders on the roles and responsibilities of conducting civil support operations through education and possibly military training.

Currently, the military is responsible for preparing and training forces for operations in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom) and Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom). However, the military has another critical role domestically in responding to disasters when local, state, and federal authorities have exhausted all available organic resources and request assistance through DoD. How much MACA education is needed and where should that instruction be taught in an officer's career? Leaders must have a clear understanding on what he or she can or cannot provide when responding to a domestic emergency. Lieutenant Colonel John R. Cook highlights the need for training when he writes in his SRP entitled *Military Support to Civil Authorities*, "as I reflect back on these events, it occurs to me that my lack of understanding of domestic support operations and the systems that support them effected the way my unit prepared to deploy and support these missions."⁷ The intent of this SRP is to examine where MACA is currently being taught, how much MACA education is needed to familiarize our leaders on the roles and responsibilities of DoD when supporting local, state, and federal authorities, and recommendations on where MACA instruction should be taught in an officer's career path.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE WITH MACA

I have had two assignments in my career where I was responsible for overseeing military response to domestic emergencies. Both assignments build upon my thesis of why MACA education is needed for our junior leaders. As a caveat, prior to my experience with MACA, I did not receive any formal military education or training on DoD's role in providing assistance to local, state, or federal agencies during a domestic disaster or emergency. As I reflect back on both of these assignments requiring military assistance, I wish I would have had the opportunity to better prepare myself on MACA through military education or training. I initially felt unprepared on both occasions and had to rely on instinct and common sense that were not always correct. As stated in issue thirty-five of the *Joint Force Quarterly*, "many commanders are unaware of their responsibilities to respond to civilian requests for emergency assistance based on Department of Defense Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities."⁸ For this reason alone, the military must include MACA education in all tiers of professional military education, potentially beginning with the introduction of basic principles such as the military is not in charge, but in support of civil authorities starting with pre-commissioning education and extending through advanced military education.

7TH INFANTRY DIVISION AND FORT CARSON

In my first assignment as Secretary to the General Staff (SGS) for the 7th Infantry Division and Fort Carson, CO, there were a number of incidents where local and state authorities would

request military assistance because of life or death situations. The majority of requests resulted when local authorities did not have the appropriate aviation assets necessary to search and to rescue mountain climbers who were either lost or stranded in the mountains surrounding Fort Carson. The majority of missions were requested through Fort Carson because the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) had an organic aviation squadron assigned to the regiment. The aircraft assigned to the 3rd ACR had the capability to fly higher in altitude than commercial search and rescue helicopters. If I would have known then that the military had the range of authority to provide support to civil authorities to prevent human suffering, save lives, or mitigate great property damage, the immediate response times for the initial missions would have occurred sooner.⁹

As SGS, I learned very quickly that when local and state authorities had exhausted all available resources they could request military assistance. However, there was a specific DoD process that the installation had to follow when informing its higher headquarters. I learned that when the military acted under immediate response, the installation was responsible to inform DoD quickly through command channels and to record all incremental costs associated with the support.¹⁰ Looking back at my first experience with MACA, if I had received some formal instruction on the military's role in responding to domestic missions through officer education, I would have been better prepared to support the civilian community when they requested military assistance. As a major, I had not received MACA instruction from the armor officer basic course, the armor officer advance course, or the Command and General Staff College.

DIRECTOR OF MILITARY SUPPORT

The second example involved my assignment to the Department of the Army. At the Pentagon, I was assigned to the Director of Military Support (DOMS) and filled the position as Current Operations Branch Chief as a lieutenant colonel. Prior to this point in my career, I was only familiar with the military's role in providing immediate response to local and state authorities. My first official duty day at DOMS was on 10 September, 2001. After receiving a number of briefings from my subordinates on the roles and responsibilities of DOMS and the types of missions the military could provide under MACA I was easily overwhelmed. I realized there were many laws, policies, and Department of Defense Directives that I was unfamiliar with and had to master immediately as the Current Operations Branch Chief. Knowing this I set out and planned a two week transition schedule to fully prepare me for the job, not knowing that on 11 September, 2001 my life would change drastically as the Current Operations Branch Chief.

September 11th started out as any other normal duty day in the Pentagon until the first of two commercial airplanes struck the World Trade Center Towers. From that day on my life changed significantly, and as a result I have a better understanding and appreciation of the military's responsibility with MACA. I learned very quickly the critical role the military played in responding to the terrorist attacks on our country. From 11 September 2001 until my departure on 31 May 2002, the military executed over one hundred MACA missions in support of 9/11 or the events following to improve America's homeland security presence.¹¹

If I had received some form of MACA education from Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) explaining DoD's roles and responsibilities in conducting civil support operations, I would have been better prepared to assume the position of Current Operations Branch Chief. The military lacks domestic prevention or consequence management interoperability and must expand its interagency role through education, exercises, and training.¹² Doing so would have increased my self awareness about military support and the flexibility I needed in the Current Operations Branch. As Mr. Pasmore stated in his book titled *Creating Strategic Change* "the more flexible an organization becomes, the better it can respond through change."¹³ It is expected that DoD will continue to play a critical role in supporting communities during declared emergencies and disasters, and the military must begin by educating its officers.

After President Bush declared a federal response to 9/11, DOMS processed forty-six requests for federal assistance (RFA) under the Stafford Act enabling the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to respond to the catastrophic events.¹⁴ Additionally, DOMS processed seventeen RFAs in support of the United States Secret Service (USSS) and seventeen RFAs in support of state and local law enforcement agencies to protect the President of the United States (POTUS) and our homeland security.¹⁵ Two RFAs were denied by DoD immediately following September 11th because of Posse Comitatus Act restrictions.¹⁶ The first denied request was for DoD explosive dog teams to patrol the FEMA headquarters in Washington, D.C., and the second was for active component military presence at the Hoover Dam as the site was considered a critical infrastructure by the Arizona governor.¹⁷

During my tenure as Current Operations Branch Chief, the complexity and sensitive nature of MACA operations dictated that I had to understand the legal, military, and regulatory requirements while processing RFAs in support of a LFA. Reflecting back on my assignment as the Current Operations Branch Chief, TRADOC needs to develop a MACA module for officers attending basic and advance courses to familiarize them with military support to civil authorities. MACA instruction should continue at the Command and General Staff College and should supplement instruction received during officer basic and advance courses. Officers can best

prepare for disaster assistance operations by understanding the appropriate laws and policies that govern the military while providing support to civil authorities.¹⁸

MACA EDUCATION IN THE OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

With the military's continued role of providing assistance to civil authorities, there remains a need for MACA education to begin early in an officer's career. As a result of 9/11, our young leaders are now being confronted with making potentially strategic level decisions after completing officer basic and advance courses as they carry out increasingly complex missions as compared to when I was a platoon leader and troop commander. With these complexities, our young officers are routinely thrust into volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous situations in which more is demanded of them in terms of intellect, initiative, and leadership.¹⁹ Therefore, developing well rounded officers requires an education program that allows leaders to remain flexible for full spectrum operations that also includes missions in support of civil authorities. The notion of a "lifelong education" is a critical component in an officer's progression if the leader wants to remain proficient throughout his or her career. Professional education provides the leader with a strong intellectual foundation on military support and should begin once a cadet is identified as a commissioned officer.

Today's Army is responsible for performing a wide variety of missions that includes military support to local, state, and federal authorities upon a declared disaster or emergency. Past experiences in providing military assistance to interagency organizations during emergencies such as hurricanes or wildfires have shown that preparedness efforts are critical in providing an effective response to natural disasters and that we must equip, train, and exercise units to mobilize for any emergency without warning remains critical.²⁰ As the Army continues to train its officers in core competencies to prepare them for conventional or asymmetric warfare, it must also include MACA education as part of their leader development process. Expanding military education to include professional knowledge of MACA will increase an individual's awareness about military support and begin to close the gap between knowledge and performance.

This MACA training should be tied to specific tasks or skills an officer will be required to perform while supporting a LFA during an emergency. Once identified, organizations normally train for MACA missions, but the foundation requires that officers receive some formal education and training prior to a disaster. Officers must be able to articulate what they can and cannot do while in support of a LFA. Units selected to perform MACA missions usually have little or no warning before they provide military support with the exception of seasonal events such as

hurricane or wildfire disaster relief missions or anticipated events such as riot control for civil disturbances. While seasonal disasters provide DoD the opportunity to train units in preparation for a declared emergency and units designated as a quick reaction force usually train to quell civil disturbances, the complexity of MACA missions requires that we educate our leaders prior to supporting an interagency event. Developing appropriate education measures and teaching those measures as part of career development requires a change in our educational philosophy and approach. The tiered education process increases the officer's professional education process and also allows for modifications to MACA instruction if roles and missions change as the result of initiatives or uncertainty through continuing education.

During this analysis I have determined that the preponderance of MACA instruction is taught later in an officer's career cycle. Officers do not receive formal instruction on disaster relief or support to a LFA until attending the Command and General Staff College. The officer basic and advance courses currently do not teach MACA instruction as a common core task. The instruction taught at the Command and General Staff College focuses primarily on Homeland Security and provides officers with an appreciation of the various types of threats facing the United States domestically. The Homeland Security course is an elective and is taught during two terms with typically forty officers enrolled in each term. MACA instruction is also taught at the Senior Service Colleges as part of the Services' core curriculum and as an elective focused at the strategic level versus the operator level where military support is most needed.

DOD AND CIVILIAN MACA EDUCATION

Currently, there are MACA education programs including the Homeland Security / Defense Education Consortium (HSDEC), the National Interagency Civil-Military Institute, the Homeland Security Planners Course taught at the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC), the DoD Emergency Preparedness Course (EPC), and the Emergency Management Institute run by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Officers attending these courses are usually majors or above and are transitioning to positions of operational and strategic importance that will use the skills being taught. Learning the roles and responsibilities of providing military support to local, state, and federal authorities needs to occur earlier in an officer's career as a result of the complexity and sensitive nature of MACA. Leaders providing support need to have a better understanding of the legal and regulatory complexities prior to a disaster occurring. A brief overview of some of the DoD and civilian education MACA courses are provided below.

The intent of listing these courses is to inform the audience on the types of MACA instruction currently available.

HOMELAND SECURITY / DEFENSE EDUCATION CONSORTIUM

This curriculum is focused around a network of teaching and research institutions promoting education, research, and cooperation related to and supporting the homeland security / defense mission by maintaining a community of higher education institutions supporting the overall homeland security effort through the sharing and advancement of knowledge.²¹ HSDEC was established by the North American Aerospace Defense Command and US Northern Command in cooperation with selected universities and the US Naval Postgraduate School.²² The course would be unacceptable from an operator standpoint because the course content is a strategic level graduate program on MACA education and does not include a program that would educate leaders in performing military support to state and local authorities. HSDEC would benefit strategic planners and Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel who are identified to serve at United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

NATIONAL INTERAGENCY CIVIL-MILITARY INSTITUTE

The Joint Interagency Training Center – West (JITC-West) formally known as the National Interagency Civil-Military Institute is a joint field office of the National Guard Bureau that offers a full spectrum of courses devoted to Homeland Security.²³ The course curriculum is primarily focused at the strategic level and offers instruction relating to disaster preparedness and consequence management. JITC-West does teach a Military Support to Civil Authorities program of instruction and the course content is designed to train individuals in the principles of military support to civil authorities focusing on the use of the National Guard, military, and civilian planning in response to a disaster.²⁴ The JITC-West education program would benefit senior leaders who are identified to serve in positions of higher authority but would not benefit junior officers who are responsible in providing military support during a disaster.

JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE

The Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) provides a variety of courses relating to homeland security. One course in particular is the Homeland Security Planners Course that focuses on homeland security matters with an interagency focus.²⁵ The course is intended to prepare DoD personnel on matters relating to homeland security planning and domestic response. The forty hour course of instruction is designed to educate majors and lieutenant colonels on homeland

security issues as it relates to joint strategy and planning and the homeland security interagency process.²⁶ The prerequisites for junior officers attending this course are undesirable since the Army must first nominate an individual who is Joint Professional Military Education 1 qualified to attend. The intent of the Homeland Security Planners Course is to prepare officers targeted for operational and strategic assignments within DoD and would not provide the lieutenant or captain with the functional skills needed when providing military support.

DOD EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS COURSE

The Emergency Preparedness Course (EPC) mission statement is to “train senior military officers, Department of Defense (DoD) civilians, and their staffs to ensure the DoD’s readiness to support its Homeland Security missions; Homeland Defense – Civil Support and to introduce National, State, Local, and DoD statutes, directives, plans, command and control relationships, and capabilities with regard to disaster and emergency response”.²⁷ Attendance is designed around those individuals who are selected to work on the joint or major command staffs who typically serve as Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs), Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLOs), or joint and major command MACA planners.²⁸ Based on the number of courses taught per year, course length, restrictions on class size, and a selected target audience, the EPC would not meet the intent of the type of basic instruction needed to familiarize all our junior leaders on MACA.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE

As part of enhancing emergency management education and training, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) conducts the Emergency Management Institute (EMI). The EMI is designed to train individuals who respond to domestic emergencies and disasters through a nationwide program of resident, field, and distance education learning initiatives.²⁹ “EMI instruction focuses on the four phases of emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery, and covers areas such as natural hazards (earthquakes, hurricanes, floods), man-made hazards (terrorism, hazardous materials, radiological emergency preparedness), and also professional development”.³⁰ The core curriculum taught at EMI does not necessarily meet the requirements to educate and to develop junior military officers as part of their professional education on MACA operations. The program at EMI is designed around individuals who are responsible for overseeing domestic disasters as the on-site commander or as a subordinate. The instruction taught at EMI does not necessarily meet the intent of this SRP because the institution primarily focuses on educating individuals who oversee disasters instead of focusing on the type of support the military can or cannot

provide during an emergency. Individuals who attend EMI are already familiar with local, state, and federal response procedures and want to further augment their professional education.

CURRENT OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM INSTRUCTION

Currently, the United States Army Cadet Command and TRADOC do not provide MACA instruction as part of their OES core curriculum. During my research in this critical area, I corresponded with various officer education directorates within TRADOC, including subordinate agencies such as the Engineer, Chemical, Military Police Schools, and the Command and General Staff College. Additionally, I spoke to representatives from the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School, training and exercise branch, J-7, Joint Task Force Civil Support, Office of the Senior Military Advisor to Civil Support for DoD, and USNORTHCOM. The comments from all parties were very receptive with recommendations that some form of MACA instruction should be imbedded into officer basic and advance courses as part of the program of instruction. One lieutenant colonel assigned to USNORTHCOM stated that MACA should be included in officer basic and advance instruction and that the military mindset of "I'm in charge" is going to have to change dramatically.³¹ Even though MACA instruction is not taught at the Engineer School, the Chief of Academics agrees with my thesis while the Military Police School is still breaking ground with instruction on coordination with civil authorities.³²

Additionally, TRADOC does not teach MACA as part of its officer Professional Military Education (PME) but can be taught as Individual Learning Education (ILE). Since MACA is not prescribed by TRADOC as a PME, there is no opportunity to train officers at either the officer basic or advance courses as part of a core curriculum. This does not necessarily mean that the topic does not get discussed in classes about Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW) or that a school might want to devote time to the subject. Perhaps focusing on MACA education as functional training for subject matter experts or as a self development distance learning module are two alternatives if TRADOC wants to pursue support to civil authorities as a common core task.

Military support to local, state, and federal authorities should be taught as just another mission that DoD must conduct. It is important that officers understand some of the unique aspects when providing military support. Currently, the first opportunity for an officer to receive formal education on MACA is at the Command and General Staff College. The Homeland Security course is an elective, and there are usually forty officers per term attending the instruction. There are a total of nine lessons and each lesson is three hours in length. Instruction focuses on FEMA and USNORTHCOM responsibilities, state response to a disaster,

and MACA legal issues. Generally, the course is designed to provide the officer with an opportunity to examine the concepts, challenges, and issues of Homeland Security focusing on the aspects of crisis action and consequence management during a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incident.³³ The course is designed to increase the depth of knowledge of the officer by examining the various programs used by local, state, and federal authorities. The curriculum is geared towards homeland security and less towards homeland defense. Unfortunately, due to course design, not every officer attending the Command and General Staff College has an opportunity to attend the course.

Fort Leonard Wood is the only TRADOC installation that is currently developing a Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) education program. The course is under development and has not yet been staffed for approval. If approved, the course will be taught to noncommissioned officers (NCOs) attending the Chemical School Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC). The proposed three hour course is aimed at a course ratio of one instructor to sixteen students and is designed to familiarize NCOs with MSCA, the authority to use MSCA, categories of disasters, and functional responsibilities to include installation response.³⁴ The Chemical School has started the process on educating its NCOs, but the instruction needs to expand to the officer corps as part of leader development and to include other MACA type missions because DoD not only responds to natural and manmade disasters but also to civil disturbances, national special security events (NSSE) and other type missions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

With the diversity of MACA operations officers may encounter early on in their careers, it is almost impossible to educate and to train leaders on every aspect of crisis and consequence management support to local, state, and federal agencies. The laws and policies that may apply to one disaster will most likely change when responding to another emergency. MACA instruction needs to be taught early in one's career. The reasoning for this is that officers are taught early on in their careers to take charge. The foundation for taking charge begins at pre-commissioning and is reinforced throughout the officer basic and advance courses. Providing support to civil authorities requires a different mindset because the military remains in support of a LFA during MACA operations. There is always a temptation to take charge of an operation, and the military must educate its leaders to realize that the Army is in the support role when responding to domestic emergencies.³⁵ The only exception where the military is the LFA is in response to homeland defense missions. To decrease the confusion, the military must train its leaders early through a formal education process. The military cannot wait for an officer to

transition from the tactical environment to the operational environment to receive MACA instruction.

The following is an outline for a recommended MACA education program and is intended to integrate MACA instruction early on in an officer's career as part of a lifelong learning process.

PRE-COMMISSIONING MACA INSTRUCTION

- United States Army Cadet Command expands the Reserve Officer Training Corps curriculum to include instruction on the role of the National Guard and its relationship to their local community, respective state, and DoD. Instruction can also include a visit to a local National Guard Armory.
- History of the Army providing support to civil authorities. Instruction should include military support to selected military operations such as hurricane relief, Salt Lake Olympics, the Los Angeles Riots, and 9/11.
- If there is a Homeland Security elective taught at the university, invite the professor to talk to the cadets.
- Have a local emergency management official discuss first responder responsibilities when a disaster is declared.

The fundamental learning objective for pre-commissioning MACA instruction would be to provide students with an overview on the relationship between military authorities and local civilian authorities in a potential deployment of military support. Instruction would center on the types of MACA missions DoD can perform focusing on the military's most recent historical disaster relief missions. Recommended time allocated towards pre-commissioning instruction would be four hours.

BASIC COURSE MACA INSTRUCTION

- Introduction on the National Strategy to Homeland Security, National Security Strategy, and National Defense Strategy and how it relates to military support to local and state authorities. Each officer should read and discuss the strategies.
- Installation Staff Judge Advocate explains the Posse Comitatus Act and the differences between Title 32 and Title 10 responsibilities.
- Brief overview of MACA, categories of disasters, military responsibilities during a disaster, and federal response plan emergency support functions focusing on the

Army Corps of Engineers as the primary agent for ESF 3. Instruction should be expanded for officers attending the Engineer Officer Basic Course.

- DoD's role in providing immediate response to local authorities prior to a disaster declaration.

The basic course MACA instruction would supplement the pre-commissioning instruction. The fundamental teaching point would be to provide officers with an introduction to the different types of crisis or consequence management missions the military can perform in support of a LFA or when DoD is the LFA for homeland defense missions. Additional familiarization instruction would focus on the Posse Comitatus Act and immediate response. Recommended time allocated towards basic course instruction would be four hours.

ADVANCE COURSE MACA INSTRUCTION

- Identify advance course students who provided military assistance to local and state authorities during their last assignment and have them lead seminar discussion on MACA.
- Integrate MACA instruction into the core curriculum focusing on categories of disasters, military responsibilities during a disaster, National Response Plan, and emergency support functions.
- Each officer should read the National Strategy to Homeland Security, National Security Strategy, and National Defense Strategy and discuss during small group instruction on how it relates to the military's roles and responsibilities.
- Have a computer based disaster simulation exercise similar to the "Hurricane James Exercise" taught during Course III at the Army War College. Instruction should include planning and preparation of likely MACA missions.

Advance course MACA instruction would continue to build upon the instruction received from the basic course. The fundamental learning objective would focus primarily on student and instructor experiences in dealing with MACA missions. Students would also review strategic documents such as the National Strategy to Homeland Security and National Defense Strategy and consider their evolution since the basic course. MACA education would culminate in a computer based disaster relief exercise where students would role play state, local, federal, and military officials. Recommended time allocated towards advance course instruction would be eight hours.

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE MACA INSTRUCTION

- Continue teaching the Homeland Security elective but make the course a graduation requirement and not an elective. If the Homeland Security course becomes resource intensive due to class size restrictions, then direct small group instructors to present the course material as part of the common core competency requirement.
- Incorporate MACA strategic topics into the large group course lecture series. To supplement the program even further, recommend that the Command and General Staff College develop a MACA Leader Day and invite various leaders from the local and state communities, state emergency management agencies, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security, National Guard Bureau, and US Northern Command.
- Have all students write a five to eight page paper on a topic relating to MACA or the military's role in providing support during a disaster.

Command and General Staff College MACA instruction would supplement the instruction received from previous military education institutes. The fundamental teaching point would continue to incorporate a deeper study of MACA and the types of missions the military can perform. MACA education would be a core graduation requirement for all officers attending the Command and General Staff College.

CONCLUSION

The development of MACA education as part of a core curriculum program will not occur overnight. As the officer education system continues to transform, TRADOC must develop a progressive MACA education program that includes common core curriculum, individual reading, correspondence, and continuing education as part of one's lifelong learning process. As the Army continues with its revolutionary transformation, TRADOC needs to educate its officers on the importance of providing military support to local authorities during an emergency. Throughout history, the military has played an important role in responding to a domestic emergency or acts of terrorism. The military has a unique ability to provide skilled personnel and equipment during a disaster but must always be mindful that DoD resources and personnel are always in support role of an agency and never in charge.³⁶ The complexity and sensitivity of MACA requires that officers understand their roles and responsibilities when providing military support.

As seen after the events of 9/11, DoD has increased its role in providing military assistance to local, state, and federal authorities in response to terrorist attacks or other natural

disasters. When directed, DoD will temporarily employ forces to support law enforcement agencies during special events, during emergencies in mitigating the consequences of an attack, in other catastrophic events, or when civilian responders are overwhelmed.³⁷ It is critical to the success of any mission that the military understands the proper relationship between DoD and other LFAs in response to a disaster. The military is never in charge of an event no matter how catastrophic it is with the exception of DoD homeland defense missions. The process in educating officers on roles and responsibilities must begin at pre-commissioning and continue throughout one's career in the military.

This research paper explored the opportunities that can be made available to educate our officers on MACA. The Army can and should do better in educating our officers on the challenges they may encounter when providing support to civil authorities. Because of the environment our Army operates in, young officers are now making decisions that have strategic impacts. Having a basic knowledge of MACA and understanding who is in charge will help standardize the military's role in responding to local, state, and federal authorities. Soldiers have not always understood this proper relationship, and the Army must educate its leaders through the officer education system, self development education, and through distance learning. Educating our officers as part of their lifelong learning process on MACA not only increases the leaders' self awareness about military support but builds flexibility within an organization. As a profession, the Army is responsible for training officers to become adaptive and self-confident leaders who are able to operate in a full spectrum environment. The Army must continue to challenge and educate our officers so they clearly understand the military's role in responding to domestic emergencies and disasters.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Army War College, *How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2003-2004* (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2003), 463.

² George W. Bush, *National Strategy for Homeland Security* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 2002), 13.

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), 8.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Joint Task Force Civil Support, *Legal Basis for Military Support to Civilian Authorities* (Fort Monroe: Joint Task Force Civil Support Public Affairs, n.d.).

⁶ John R. Cook, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 10 April 1999), 1.

⁷ Ibid., 4.

⁸ Adrian A. Erckenbrack and Aaron Scholer, "The DOD Role in Homeland Security," *Joint Force Quarterly* 35 (October 2004): 37.

⁹ Northern Command, *Concept of Operations* (Peterson AFB: U.S. Northern Command, 1 March 2004), 6-20.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ J K. Chesney, "Military Support to Civil Authority Mission Status Matrix," matrix with request for federal assistance data, Washington, D.C.: Pentagon, 11 September 2001 to 10 May 2002.

¹² Erckenbrack and Scholer, 38.

¹³ William A. Pasmore, *Creating Strategic Change: Designing the Flexible, High-Performing Organization* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994), 4.

¹⁴ Chesney.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Department of the Army, *Domestic Support Operations*, Field Manual 100-19 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 1 July 1993), 5-4.

¹⁹ Jeffrey D. McCausland and Gregg F. Martin, "Transforming Strategic Leader Education for the 21st-Century Army," *Parameters* 3 (Autumn 2001): 19.

²⁰ Bush, 41.

²¹ Homeland Security / Defense Education Consortium Homepage, "Introduction," available from <<http://www.hsdec.org/default.aspx>>; Internet; accessed 6 November 2004.

²² Ibid.

²³ Joint Interagency Training Center – West (JITC-West) Webpage, "About JITC-West," available from <http://www.nici.org/JITC/About_JITC.html>; Internet; accessed 8 November 2004.

²⁴ Joint Interagency Training Center – West (JITC-West) Webpage, "Course Listings," 26 October 2004; available from <http://www.nici.org/Course_Info/Course_listings.html>; Internet, accessed 8 November 2004.

²⁵ Joint Forces Staff College Webpage, "Welcome," available from <http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/schools_programs/homeland_security/overview.asp>; Internet; accessed 8 November 2004.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Department of Defense, *Emergency Preparedness Course – 2004 Curriculum Guide* (Fort McPherson: U.S. Army Forces Command), 1.

²⁸ Ibid., 8.

²⁹ Emergency Management Institute Webpage, "Welcome message from Steve Sharro, Emergency Management Institute Superintendent," available from <<http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/DirMsg.asp>>; Internet; accessed 19 November 2004.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Todd K. Chamberlain <todd.chamberlain@js.pentagon.mil>, "RE: Military Support," electronic mail message to J K. Chesney <j.chesney@us.army.mil>, 5 November 2004.

³² Richard D. Rodgers <richard.rodgers1@us.army.mil>, "RE: Officer Education," electronic mail message to J K. Chesney <j.chesney@us.army.mil>, 18 November 2004.

³³ Rick Messer <rick.messer@us.army.mil>, "RE: Officer Training (UNCLASSIFIED)," electronic mail message to J K. Chesney <j.chesney@us.army.mil>, 16 November 2004.

³⁴ Frances Bloom <frances.bloom@us.army.mil>, "FW: Officer Education with Support to Civilian Authorities.doc," electronic mail message to J K. Chesney <j.chesney@us.army.mil>, 17 November 2004.

³⁵ Field Manual 100-19, 5-6.

³⁶ *How the Army Runs*, 482.

³⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004), 9.

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